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For over twenty years, a voucher system has been used in Chile to promote competition in the
educational system between public and private schools.  Attending a private subsidized school is associated
with increased standardized test scores, but the apparent impact is relatively small. Controlling for school
choice using a supply-side instrument (school availability at community level) implies substantially larger
impacts of the voucher system.   The effect of parents’ education on academic performance is smaller than
that implied by simple OLS estimates that do not control for school choice. Finally, the results also show
that family school choice is gender biased, females are sent more often to voucher schools while males are
sent more often to private (non voucher) schools.   In addition, the TSLS estimates show that females gain
less than males from going to voucher schools.
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1.    Introduction 
Many studies have shown the importance of education as a source of increased earnings.   In 
addition, in many developing countries equalizing education and opportunities is also advocated as 
means to reduce income inequality.    In the past decades, debates on how to improve the access and 
quality of education have been intense and controversial.   On the one hand, this goal may be achieved 
by adding more resources to the educational system.   However, there is yet no clear evidence on 
when such policies are successful (Hanushek 1986, 1996).   Alternatively, Friedman (1955) proposed 
the introduction of a voucher system, arguing that the ensuing competition generated among schools 
would improve the quality of education.   Parents would prefer to send their children to good schools 
and as a consequence bad schools would loose enrollment and eventually disappear from the market.   
Although the theoretical arguments in favor of a voucher system as a means to improve the 
quality of education are clear, there has not been sufficient empirical evidence to know whether or 
when this type of system might work.   In this paper we use Chilean data to analyze this issue.   Free 
choice of schools together with a voucher system providing public funding to both private and public 
schools was introduced in Chile over twenty years ago.   Thus, Chilean data offers the opportunity to 
examine educational performance in a country where vouchers have been implemented on a large 
scale (national level) and where many new schools have been created.   Therefore, it is a promising 
case study of the potential merits of this market based educational system.   
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In this study we examine the impact of different types of school on performance, as measured 
by a standardized performance test, the Academic Aptitude Test (PAA), a college entrance 
examination analogous to the SAT in the United States.   Previous studies using Chilean data using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis show that voucher schools perform more akin to public rather 
than private schools when test results are analyzed (Rodriguez, 1988; Mizala and Romaguera, 2000). 
  This result of the existing literature has cast some doubt regarding the merits of the voucher scheme. 
  However, I find that traditional OLS estimates are significantly biased because they do not control 
for the endogeneity of school choice.   Using the availability (supply) of schools at the community 
level as an instrument for school choice, Two-Stage Least Square (TSLS) estimates are obtained.   
The results show that the impact of attending a private subsidized voucher school versus a public non-
subsidized school more than doubles with respect to OLS estimates.   At the same time, we observe a 
drop in the importance of parental education on children’s academic performance.  Therefore, the 
previous literature has overestimated the impact of parental education and underestimated the impact 
of the voucher system in providing better education. 
In this paper I also analyze the determinants of access to higher education, and the impacts 
that school choice and other variables such as gender may have in this respect.   We find that while 
female students are more likely to obtain better grades than males during high school, their PAA test 
scores are significantly lower.   The selection of students going to private schools favors males.   Thus 
the family choice of sending children to private non-subsidized schools is gender biased, and girls go 
more often to the voucher schools.  However, the TSLS estimates show that girls gain less than boys 
from going to these schools.  These outcomes imply that the educational gender gap may be 
widening.   4  
 
 
The evidence presented in this paper gives strong empirical support to the ascribed theoretical 
benefits of a voucher system in education.  The voucher system in Chile seems to provide students 
with the opportunity to increase their test scores and improve their chances of access to higher 
education, and thus higher future earnings.  We do find, however, that there is a case to introduce 
special policies aimed at improving female performance. 
The paper is organized as follows.  The second section of the paper briefly describes the 
Chilean voucher system.  In addition, this section presents a description of the Chilean educational 
system and how the PAA test works in the selection of students for higher education.  This section 
also outlines the methodological issues and reviews the empirical evidence.  The third section 
describes the data.  Section four presents the results.   Conclusions are found at the end of the paper. 
 
2.    The Chilean Voucher System 
The Chilean voucher system has been working since 1980.  This long period of functioning 
provides with a strong ground to evaluate how well the system is actually working.  Prior to 1980, 
the administration of the Chilean school system was fully centralized in the Ministry of Education. 
The Ministry was not only responsible for the curriculum of the whole education system, but also for 
the administration of the public schools, which accounted for 80 percent of all schools in the country. 
 The ministry also appointed public school teachers and principals, as well as approving and paying 
expenses and salaries. 
The decentralization process initiated in the early 1980s transferred the administration of 
public-sector schools to the municipalities.
1 In addition, the reform opened the way for the private 
sector to participate as a provider of publicly financed education, by establishing a voucher-type per-  5  
 
 
student subsidy.   Three types of schools were established: Municipal schools- financed by the per 
student subsidy granted by the state and run by municipalities; Private subsidized schools- financed by 
the per-student subsidy and run by the private sector (from now on referred to as voucher schools); 
and private fee-paying schools- financed by fees paid by parents and managed by the private sector.
2  
The voucher system gives families complete freedom to choose schools for their children: they can 
choose a free subsidized school, either municipal or private.  Alternatively, they can choose a fee-
paying private school if they can afford the tuition fees.  In 1998, the monthly voucher per student 
was about forty five dollars. 
In a traditional voucher system the government makes payments directly to families to enable 
them to choose which public or private schools their children attend.   In the Chilean system, the 
government subsidizes the school chosen by parents in direct proportion to the size of enrollment.  
Specifically, the government pays each school one school subsidy unit (SSU) for every child attending 
classes there.   In other words, the size of the subsidy paid per student is the same for both the 
municipal and subsidized private schools.
3 
Thus the school dependency (privately paid, voucher or public) is a choice variable, which 
may be correlated with resources at home, location, poverty at community level, community size, etc. 
 In addition, many private schools perform admission tests, where only the best students are accepted. 
 These schools also select students on the basis of family characteristics, including parent’s education, 
religion, and family income.  However, voucher schools cannot select students in that way.   The only 
constraint for voucher schools is the number of students per class, which may not exceed 45. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
1 The total number of municipalities in Chile is 326.  The number of community encompassed in this data set is 298.  
2 Between 1981 and 1996, enrollment in private voucher schools expanded from 15% to around 33% of the total; most of 
these gains at the expense of public schools enrollments.   6  
 
 
2.1  The Chilean Educational System and Access to Higher Education 
The Chilean educational system is divided into three levels.  Primary education is mandatory 
and consists of eight years of schooling.  Secondary education covers four or five years of schooling 
for humanistic and technical (vocational) schools respectively.  The technical schools are designed for 
students who want to achieve a technical diploma in accounting, secretarial work, mechanics, etc.  
The curriculum for the first two years of a technical school is equivalent to that of the humanistic 
schools, but for the last three years mostly covers a technical curriculum. Tertiary education is 
composed of education in Technical Formation Centers (TFC), Professional Institutes (PI) and both 
public and private universities.
4 Upon finishing secondary education students decide to continue 
studying or enter the labor force.  However, most job offers and educational institutions require the 
PAA score. 
The Academic Aptitude Test is divided into two groups of tests: aptitude (PAA) and 
knowledge (PCE).  The aptitude test (PAA) is primarily oriented towards identifying innate skills of 
students.  Therefore, they are assumed to be relatively stable over time.  This test follows the 
structure of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT).  On the other hand, the Knowledge test identifies the 
knowledge acquired by students in secondary schools.  The results in both examinations are presented 
in standardized terms, with a score fluctuating between 0-850 points.  The PAA is divided into two 
tests: mathematics and reading.  These tests are mandatory for any application to higher education.  
The Knowledge tests are divided into Biology, Physics, Mathematics, Social Sciences, and Chemistry. 
                                                 
4 Public universities are not free in Chile.   The annual tuition varies depending on the major in which the students are 
enrolled.   For example, Economics costs about 3,000 dollars per year.   However, low-income students may apply for public 
loans, which cover the tuition as a function of the family income. This loan has to be repaid to the university after graduation.   7  
 
 
Students pursuing a university career need to undergo this examination process.  The number 
of tests they need to take is a function of the field of study to which they want to apply.
5 For example, 
aspiring Economics students must take the PAA in mathematics and reading.  In addition, they also 
need to take the PCE in mathematics.  
 The PAA system provides a ranking of students, which affects 
their access to higher education.   In the test a correct answer is assigned one point towards the final 
score, while a wrong answer subtracts 0.25 from the score.  This procedure generates a “corrected 
score”.  By using the corrected score, the average and standard deviation is calculated for each test.  
The average of the corrected score is set at 500 points, then the scores are adjusted to a normal 
distribution with a standard deviation equal to 100 points. 
In Chile, only 15 percent of university students come from the poorest 40 percent of families.  
The selective university entrance process can largely explain this situation.   Of the students taking the 
examination, only 40 percent end up being admitted, only 25 percent are accepted in "traditional" 
universities, and just 5 percent are accepted by the country’s two most prestigious universities: 
Universidad de Chile and Universidad Católica.  Finally, this percentage is reduced significantly if we 
consider access to the majors having the highest demand, such as Medicine, Economics, Engineering, 
Law, Psychology and Architecture.  
6  In 1998, 178,526 students were in the fourth year of secondary 
education, and as such were eligible to take the exam.  From this group about 80% actually did so.   
Access to higher education has a significant effect on earnings.  Bravo et.  al.  (1999) using 
data for the last 40 years in Chile shows that the return to schooling varying significantly by 
educational level.  In particular, the evidence indicates that the return to schooling in Chile not only 
follows a convex pattern, but also the convexity has been increasing over time.  In 1960 the return for 
an additional year in primary education was equivalent to 7%, the return to secondary and tertiary 
                                                 
5    For some majors additional tests are required.   8  
 
 
education were 10 and 13 percent respectively.  In 1998, these returns are 7%, 10% and 21% for 
primary, secondary and tertiary education respectively.  Therefore, by accessing higher education, in 
which a good performance in the PAA test is required, individuals will enjoy significantly higher 
earnings.   For individuals from poor families, access to higher education means greater earnings and 
upward social mobility. 
2.2  Empirical Evidence and Methodological Issues 
2.2.1  Empirical Evidence 
A study of the voucher system and the educational achievement on the PAA could be 
undertaken from several perspectives.  The traditional “production function” approach is to analyze 
the relationship between inputs and outputs of the educational process.  Most production function 
studies explain test scores as the output of school inputs, home and individual inputs.  Within this 
context, controlling for other characteristics, a dummy variable identifying private establishments 
would measure the gap between private and public education. 
Previous studies using OLS evidence indicate attending a voucher school in primary education 
does increase educational achievement, but that the impact is relatively small.  This type of evidence 
has been used to argue that parental schooling and attendance in a private school are the most 
important factors in accessing better education.  Others have used this evidence against the voucher 
system arguing no impact of private provider on school performance.  This argument is questionable 
for at least two reasons.   First, the actual evidence is not robust in the sense that only OLS estimates 
have been provided, which are biased due to endogeneity of school choice.  Second, even though the 
outcomes associated with private and public school providers were similar, they could be explained by 
the competitive pressure of the private schools forcing the public schools to be equally efficient. 
                                                                                                                                                       
6  See Table 2.   Admission figure were obtained from Ministry of Education   9  
 
 
The literature on educational production functions contains a number of controversial results, 
and at the present time there is a continuing debate on this topic fueled by new studies.  The 
controversial aspects of these results are reviewed in Hanushek (1986, 1996).   Hanushek concludes 
that available studies, which estimate production functions, do not find inputs such as the 
teacher/student ratio, teacher’s education, experience and salary, and expenditure per student on 
education have a significant effect on test scores.   
Additional discussion on these results can be found in Hedges, Laine and Greenwald (1994) 
and Hedges and Greenwald (1996), where the previous conclusions are questioned.  Card and 
Krueger (1992, 1996) evaluate the effect of the available resources in schools on student performance 
in the labor market.   This study finds a significant effect between the cost and quality of the inputs on 
earnings in the labor market.  This study has been scrutinized by other authors (mainly Heckman, 
Layne-Farrar and Todd (1996)).  For this reason, it is still premature to suggest a general conclusion 
on this topic. 
The traditional estimates of the private/public school gap in test scores (for example, Chubb 
and Moe (1990)) have the additional problem of selection bias, besides the bias of omitted input 
variables.   The school type (private, public or voucher) is a choice variable, which may depend on 
family resources and the availability of such schools (restrictions).   Therefore, estimating a model 
without considering the endogeneity of school choice would bias the estimates. 
There are various econometric studies on Chile that summarize evidence on the public-private 
educational gap in primary education (Rodriguez, 1988; Aedo and Larranaga, 1994; Bravo, Contreras 
and Sanhueza, 1999).  These studies rely on the average standardized test scores as the dependent 
variable.  Among many independent variables, a dummy variable is included, which indicates the 
school category: privately paid, voucher, or public.  All the studies mentioned earlier are based on   10  
 
 
data on primary education at school level.  In other words, there is no information available at the 
individual level, but only school averages.   Based on OLS estimates these studies do not find 
significant differences in achievement between public and voucher schools.   
The most recent evidence on this topic is in Mizala and Romaguera (JHR, 2000).  This paper 
follows the empirical strategy outlined above.  The school average test score in primary education is 
correlated with a vector of average family, school and individual characteristics.  They use all the 
information at the school level in the 1996 SIMCE (more than five thousand schools).  They add 
information on the health status of children from JUNAEB (the institution in charge of administering 
governmental school-food programs).  The group of control variables includes a measure of the 
socioeconomic level, a vulnerability index of the school, a geographical index, experience of the 
teacher, the student/ teacher ratio, etc.  The dependent variable is defined as the average test score in 
the Mathematics and Reading tests.  The main conclusion of this study is that the initial difference in 
the average scores between schools of different types, of almost 5 points in favor of the private 
subsidized schools, disappears when socioeconomic characteristics are added into the regression.  In 
addition, the sign is reversed, indicating a difference in favor of the municipal schools after controls 
are included. 
This paper and the others mentioned above have serious limitations.   First, the reports are 
based on school averages; therefore there is a significant fraction of variation, which is missing from 
the analysis.   In addition, the results are presented for the average score in mathematics and reading; 
no gender-stratified analysis is performed.  Second, many of the explanatory variables are jointly 
determined choices at the family or school levels, and no attempt is made to examine and solve these 
problems.  Finally, the main result is based on an estimated parameter of the school type, which is a 
choice variable and therefore OLS estimates are not appropriate.   11  
 
 
2.2.2  Methodological Issues 
This paper determines the impact on students' scores in the PAA of having attended different 
types of schools (privately paid, voucher or public).  It draws on data at the level of the individual, 
available for students graduating from secondary education and applying for entrance to higher 
education (a point of inflexion for future earnings).  Before proceeding, however, it is important to 
notice two potential sources of bias on student scores.  First, the type of school  (privately paid, 
voucher, or public) is an endogenous choice variable, which may be correlated with resources at 
home, location, restrictions, etc.  The methodology used in this paper compares OLS and Two Stage 
Least Squares (TSLS) results, which account endogenously for the school type parents choose to 
send their children. 
Another selection problem arises from the fact that not all graduated students take the PAA 
test, and not all members of a birth cohort complete secondary school to qualify for the test.  In order 
to solve these problems, different models and samples would be required. 
The TSLS model is implemented as follows.  In the first stage a Multinomial Logit (ML) is 
estimated to predict the probability of choosing a private or a voucher school (public schools are used 
as the reference case).   The model hypothesizes that the school choice is a function of resources at 
home and the actual availability of alternative types of schools in the area.  Household resources are 
assumed to be a function of parental educational attainment.  School availability is defined as two 
dummy variables, which identify whether at community level a private or a voucher school is 
operating.   These last variables allow us to identify the school choice model given that availability is 
correlated with school choice, but not correlated with students’ ability or family unobserved variables. 
 Thus, school choice is influenced by local school supply (proxied by school availability), but that 
school availability at the community level does not influence individual achievement.     12  
 
 
Nevertheless, the proposed instruments are not wholly free of problems.  Migration makes the 
instruments correlated with parent preferences for quality schools and thus makes them correlated 
with the error in the test achievement equation which could invalidate the instruments, making the 
school choice estimates biased.  Similarly, private or voucher schools may be inclined to locate in 
larger or richer communities.  Then, availability may partially reflect unobserved characteristics of 
families or communities.  Thus availability cannot properly be excluded from the achievement 
regressions.  The impact of this potential problem is examined below. 
Thus the TSLS estimates are based on school supply-side innovations.  In the first stage, the 
school choice variable (dependent variable) is defined for student attending private, voucher and 
public schools.  The public school is taken as a reference.  The explanatory variables are age, parental 
education and the supply instruments, mainly availability.    In the second stage two specifications are 
estimated.   In specification A, the individual achievement is explained by age, age squared, parental 
education and the predicted probabilities obtained from the ML model (first stage).  This specification 
uses the availability of the private and voucher school to provide identification for the predicted 
attending school variables.   This is then the identification which we are confident of if the location of 
those private and voucher schools across regions were uncorrelated with unobserved characteristics 
of the communities and hence students which would influence their test scores, or in the extreme case 
a random treatment of a program design.
7  In sum, the A estimates would be fine if private and 
voucher schools were randomly allocated across regions.  However, it is expected that private schools 
would establish themselves first in larger population communities, and probably in higher density ones 
to reduce commuting costs, and of course in communities with higher income which are more likely 
to be willing to pay the private tuitions for possibly better schools.    But these same variables are also   13  
 
 
likely to influence student scores due to unobserved characteristics of the communities and families 
and children.  Therefore, specification B recognizes these three characteristics (density, total 
population and average income) of the communities might influence scores and school locations.   
The ML is estimated separately for males and females.  From this estimation fitted valued are 
obtained for the probability of attending private and voucher schools. 
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In the second stage, the dependent variable is the performance in the PAA test of individual i 
in community j.  The right-hand side endogenous variables are replaced by their fitted probabilities.  
In addition, individual age, parental education (Sf  , Sm represent schooling of father and mother 
respectively) and community characteristics are included as others explanatory variables.  The TSLS 
model is run for males and females
8: 
[2A]  Specification A:   
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7 For a discussion on the impact of a voucher system using experimental data see Angrist et.al.  (2000). 
8 For a detailed discussion on the properties of the TSLS estimator see Hamilton (1994).  Chapter 9, Section 9.2 Instrumental   14  
 
 
[2B]  Specification B: 
i
CAPI a CTP a D a v P a p P a m S a f S a Age a Age a a j
i PAA m + + + + + + + + + + =
￿ ￿





D: Density in community j, defined as total population divided by kilometers square. 
CTP: Community total population 
CAPI: Community average per capita income 
 
3.    Data 
The study uses the Academic Aptitude Test (PAA) database for 1998.  Table 1 presents the 
number of students taking the exams between 1994-1998.  In 1994 136,712 students were enrolled to 
take the PAA exam, this figure increased to 142,382 in 1998.  On average these numbers represent 
about 78% of the students who graduated from secondary education.  Although this percentage is 
relatively representative of the total population, it varies significantly across regions, fluctuating 
between 58-85%.   
Table 1A presents the coverage of population in primary and secondary education from a 
long-term perspective.  In 1970 nearly 50% of the population eligible to attend secondary education 
was actually attending.  In contrast, this percentage is about 90% for primary education.  These 
figures reach 96% and 82% in 1998, for primary and secondary education, respectively. 
Table 2 presents the population distribution for 1998.   The first column describes the region 
from north to south, the second column presents the total population in each region.  Regions 5, 8 
and the Metropolitan region (MR) are the ones with higher concentration of population.  The third 
                                                                                                                                                       
variables and Two-Stage Least Squares.   15  
 
 
column describes the population in the age range, which is equivalent to attending secondary 
education (potential population attending secondary education).  Column 4 presents the actual 
enrollment in the fourth year of secondary education.  The next columns describe the number of 
people eligible to take the PAA test.  Finally, columns 6 and 7 present the students enrolled in the 
PAA test and its percentage with respect to those eligible. 
Table 3 gives some basic descriptive information on the sample.  The students come from 
families where parents have mostly secondary education.  About 23 percent of the applicants reported 
that their father has completed at least primary education, while over 40 percent indicated that their 
father has completed at least secondary education.  Finally, students whose fathers have some degree 
of university education represent about 34%.  A similar pattern is shown for students? mothers. 
In 1998, from the students enrolled in the PAA test 21% come from private schools, 45% 
from public and 35% from voucher schools.  However, family school choice is gender bias: while a 
22% of males attend private schools,  only a 19% of females attend this type of schools.  Seventy six 
percent of the students attend co-educational secondary schools.  In contrast, only 10% attended male 
schools and 15% only females’ schools.  Finally, 75% of the applicants choose a humanistic school 
and 90% of these individuals reported a daily class schedule. 
Tables 4 and 5 present statistics on the average score by gender and school types, 
respectively.  In Table 4, males systematically score higher on the test than females, but they obtain 
lower grades during secondary school.  This pattern is consistent for the whole set of characteristics. 
Table 5 presents the average scores by type of schools and for the PAA in mathematics and reading. 
Private school performs better than voucher and public schools.  A positive correlation is also 
observed between average test score and parent’s education.  This effect is even greater when both   16  
 
 
parents have higher education.  For each PAA test and type of school, males obtain better scores than 
females.   
Figure 1 presents the score distribution by school type.  Private schools show a better 
performance in both mathematics and reading, while voucher and public schools exhibit a similar 
distribution.  Without further analysis this data would suggest that voucher schools perform more 
akin to public than to private schools. 
 
4.    Results 
Table 6 shows the ML estimates for school choice for males and females.
9 The dependent 
variable is defined as a dummy for the choice of a private school and a voucher school.   Public 
schools are taken as a reference.  Individual age and its square are included as explanatory variables. 
In addition, a proxy for family resources is included in the form of parental education and access to 
various types of schools is instrumentalized using a dummy variable, which indicates whether the 
school type is available at the community level.  For each choice variable, i.e., attending a private or a 
voucher school, two dummy variables are used indicating whether in such community a private and a 
voucher school is available.  These last variables are the key to identifying the econometric model in 
the first stage.  In addition, the TSLS estimates are jointly estimated with the first stage. Then, 
recognizing that the endogenous explanatory variables for school choice are not actual variables but 
the predicted values with less variability, the standard errors were corrected for clustering at the 
community level.
10  The table presents marginal effects, rather than coefficients. Therefore, I assume 
                                                 
9  For both, PAA mathematics and reading under different specifications, the evidence suggests males and females perform 
differently in the PAA tests.  Consequently, the econometric specifications will be presented separately by gender. 
10 Essentially the degrees of freedom are given by the number of school districts.  The same cluster adjustment is performed in 
the second stage.   17  
 
 
that school choice is influenced by local school supply (proxied by school availability), but that school 
availability does not influence achievement.   
The positive coefficient on availability accords with expectation – that increasing availability of 
a given school type in a municipality increases the probability that it is chosen, all else equal.  The 
results in Table 6 indicate a positive correlation between the parental education and choosing a 
private school.  The cross effects of the supply of private schools on voucher school choice and the 
cross effect of the voucher school supply effect on private school choice have the expected negative 
sign (which may be interpreted as effect of competition in the educational system), though not 
generally statistically significant.  As expected, the availability of a private (voucher) school increases 
the probability of attending a private (voucher) institution.   
The evidence also shows a positive correlation between parental education and choosing a 
voucher school, however, in comparison to private schools, these effects are smaller.  On the other 
hand, the effect of this availability of voucher schools exhibits a positive and significant impact on the 
probability of attending a voucher school.   
The Multinomial Logit estimates provide the expected probabilities of attending private and 
voucher schools, which are used as explanatory variables in the second stage. 
As noted before, the instruments are expected to be correlated with school choice, but be 
uncorrelated with the error term in the equation for test score.  Table 7 presents an auxiliary 
regression at the community level, which sheds light on this hypothesis.  The dependent variables are 
the school supply instruments (i.e. availability of a private and voucher school) and the explanatory 
variables are the child’s age, parental education, and other individual and family characteristics.  The 
estimated model is Probit, and the marginal effects are reported in table 7.  The community income, 
density, and size variables are also included in alternative specifications.  The only variable in the test   18  
 
 
equation that is correlated with the school supply instruments, is the mother’s secondary and tertiary 
schooling in the full sample of 287 communities.  However, when community characteristics are 
included, the sample is reduced to 181 communities.  These characteristics are obtained from a 
different data set (CASEN, 1998) where information was available only for this reduced sample. 
Table 8 presents the OLS and TSLS for the performance in the PAA test score.  The 
dependent variable is defined as the score in Mathematics and Reading.  Among the explanatory 
variables I included age of the student, parental education and the school choice.  This table 
summarizes the estimates divided by gender and type of test.  For each test (mathematics and reading) 
the first model presents the OLS estimates for males and females including only individual and family 
characteristics.  The second specification shows the OLS model when school choice variables are 
included.  Then, the TSLS model is presented.   In specification A, school availability, individual age 
and parental education are included, and in specification B density, average per capita income and 
total population in the community are added to the regression.
11 
The OLS estimates indicate that after controlling for individual, family and school 
characteristics, attending a private school increases the PAA score in mathematics by 54 for males 
and 66 points for females.  The impact of attending a voucher school is about 12 and 13 additional 
points for males and females.  Moreover, the PAA reading results are similar.  By attending a private 
school, males obtain 49 additional points, while females obtain 60 more points.  The magnitude is 
reduced for voucher schools.  Indeed, males and females obtain an additional 12 and 18 more points 
than students attending public schools.  However, for males these effects are not statistically 
significant from public schools.  These results are similar to the ones reported in the existing 
literature.     19  
 
 
However, a direct interpretation of the OLS results may be misleading because the type of 
school is a choice variable, in which case they are biased.  The sign of the bias depends on the 
selection process operating through the educational system.  If we believe that more educated and/or 
richer parents select the best schools for their children, then after controlling for the endogeneity of 
the school choice the TSLS estimates should be lower.  In other words, the OLS estimates are biased 
upwards. 
On the contrary, as it was suggested by Card (2001), Kling (2000) and Carneiro, Heckman 
and Vytlacil (2001), the institutional features of the educational system such as the availability of 
different types of school as the instrument to identify the school choice decision would have a 
different effect on specific population groups.
12  In that case, the TSLS estimator based on school 
availability as an instrument is more likely to affect the schooling choices of poorer individuals, who 
would otherwise choose only public schools.  In other words, in the hypothetical case where all the 
children in public schools were moved to private and voucher schools, then we would expect that 
these children would score relatively higher than the children already enrolled in private and voucher 
institutions (diminishing return to score).   Thus, after correcting for endogeneity the estimated impact 
of private and voucher schools should increase.  By using supply-side features to instrument schooling 
choices the TSLS estimates should be larger than the corresponding OLS estimates.
13  In other words, 
if the marginal benefit of attending a private or a voucher school were higher for the lowest 
                                                                                                                                                       
11 The previous results remain when we add regional dummies to control for geographical heterogeneity, suggesting that 
effects between and within regions are similar in their effect on test scores. 
12 For instance Card (1995b) speculates that the effect of college proximity is more important for children of less wealthy 
households. 
13 As mentioned in Kling (2000), these estimates represent the average marginal benefit from an additional student enrolled in 
a private/voucher school for the subgroup affected by school availability instrument.   For additional discussion see Imbens 
and Angrist (1994) and Angrist and Imbens (1995)   20  
 
 
background fraction of the population (students previously attending public schools) this second 
hypothesis would be consistent with the finding of larger TSLS than OLS estimates.
14 
The policy conclusions are different.  In the first hypothesis, a matching between good schools 
and good students occurs, which operates through the parental decision.  In that case, the voucher 
system would not be a valid explanation for the improvement in the quality of the student 
achievement.  In the second hypothesis, the voucher schools would be making a significant 
contribution to increase the access of poorer students (a fraction in the population) who without this 
type of schools would have a lower score and less opportunities to enter tertiary schooling.   
The TSLS results presented in Table 8 are striking.  While the OLS estimates predict that 
voucher schools contribute to an increase in the PAA score of 12-18 points, these figures increase 
significantly when TSLS is used.   The TSLS column A estimates use the availability of the private 
and voucher school to provide identification for the predicted attending school variables.   This is then 
the identification which assumes the location of those private and voucher schools across regions is 
uncorrelated with unobserved characteristics of the communities and hence unobserved students’ 
abilities which would influence their test scores.  In other words, the results in column A represent the 
extreme case of where the schools were randomly assigned to regions.  However, private schools are 
likely to establish themselves first in larger population communities, and probably in higher density 
ones to reduce commuting costs, and of course in communities with higher income which are more 
likely to be willing to pay the private tuitions for possibly better schools.    But these same variables 
are also likely to influence student scores due to unobserved characteristics of the communities and 
families and children.   Hence, specification B recognizes these three characteristics of the 
communities might influence scores and school locations.  Specification B leads to a substantial 
                                                 
14 See Card (2001) for a summary in the literature supporting such findings.   21  
 
 
reduction in the magnitude of the estimated school type effects in comparison to specification A.  In 
addition, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test – at the bottom of specification B – supports  the assumption 
that the school attending variables are not exogenous in model B.
15  Therefore the TSLS specification 
B presents the preferred estimates of the school treatment effects. 
The impact of the TSLS estimates decreases – especially for females – when the community 
characteristics are included in specification B, but they are still substantially larger than the OLS and 
statistically significant.  In mathematics while males attending voucher schools would obtain 49 
additional points than in public schools, females in voucher school would obtain 32 additional points 
than in public schools.  On the other hand, in reading we still observe a significant positive impact of 
voucher schools, males score 63 additional points, while females obtain 55 more points than in public 
schools.  Therefore, using different specifications we find that students enrolled in voucher schools 
perform substantially better than in public ones.  The evidence also indicates that such effects are 
lower for females. 
At the same time, parental contribution to PAA score is reduced significantly when 
instruments are used.  In particular, the most important contribution to the OLS estimates is given by 
parental higher education.  For example, for males taking the mathematics test, such a contribution is 
reduced from 55 and 39 for father and from 50 to 34 for mother.  Therefore, parents’ contribution is 
reduced significantly with respect to the OLS estimates.  A similar pattern is observed for females and 
for the PAA reading test.  Thus, while previous OLS estimates of the impact of parental education 
were overestimated, the impact of school choice variables was underestimated.  Finally, when 
                                                 
15 This test involves adding to model B the residuals from the estimated model predicting attending by school types to the 
score second stage equations.   When the estimated coefficient on these residuals are statistically significantly different from 
zero, it implies that the OLS and IV estimates differ and therefore attending school is not exogenous but endogenous.  For 
details, see Davidson, R.  and J.  G.  MacKinnon (1993).   22  
 
 
different samples are used (regions with higher enrollment, students attending humanistic and daily 
schools) the TSLS estimates do not change substantially. 
 
5.    Summary and Conclusions  
The voucher system assumes that competition generated between schools will improve the 
quality of education.  The evidence obtained by using OLS estimates indicates that attending a 
voucher school is associated with higher standardized scores, but the impact is relatively small.   This 
finding has been reported on several occasions, but using only school level information and averages 
of family characteristics.   
This paper uses a supply-side instrument to model school choice.  In particular, the instrument 
is defined as the availability of different types of schools in a locality.  The paper presents evidence on 
the impact of individual, family and school characteristics on test scores in nationwide university 
entrance examinations in Chile.  Different specifications and empirical strategies are employed to 
determine the robustness of the results.   
Traditional analyses based on OLS find that voucher schools are only somewhat better than 
public schools, well below the performance of private schools.  However, when TSLS models are 
estimated in order to control for school choice, the impact of attending a voucher school versus 
public increases substantially (at least doubling the OLS estimated impact).   The evidence suggests 
that voucher schools have their biggest impact on males.  Corresponding to the increased impact of 
voucher schools on students’ achievement scores, our results suggest that previous estimates of the 
impact of parents’ education on test scores have been considerably overestimated. 
Thus, by using school availability to instrument schooling choices, TSLS estimates of voucher 
school effects on test scores exceed the corresponding OLS estimates.  These TSLS estimates   23  
 
 
represent the average marginal benefit from an additional student enrolled in a private/voucher school 
for the subgroup affected by school availability instrument.  In other words, if the marginal benefit of 
attending a private or a voucher school were higher for the lowest background fraction of the 
population (student currently attending public schools) this would be consistent with the larger 
estimates (with respect to the OLS estimates) using supply availability as an instrument. 
My results suggest that policy makers should support a voucher system and increase its 
availability.  The voucher system is a mechanism that increases scholastic achievement, as measured 
by the university entrance examinations.  Increases in these test scores will thus provide students with 
greater access to higher education, and thus future social mobility.     
Finally, while female students are more likely to obtain better grades than males during high 
school, their PAA test scores are significantly lower.  The selection of students going to private 
schools favors males.  Thus the family choice of sending children to private schools is gender biased, 
but girls go more often to the voucher schools.  However, the TSLS estimates show that girls gain 
less than boys from going to these schools.  These outcomes suggest that the educational gender gap 
may be widening as a consequence in Chile.   24  
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Table 2: Population and enrrollement by regions, 1998.
Total  Population 14-17 Enrolled in fourth Eligible to Enrolled in PAA % Enrolled in PAA
population (1) Sec. Education (1) year High School (2) take PAA (2) graduated 1997 (3) graduated 1997
Region ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) = ( 4 / 3 )
1 375,705 25,371 4,268 3,970 2,376 59.8
2 441,821 21,863 4,702 4,365 79.9
3 255,934 11,748 2,471 2,281 1,898 83.2
4 549,337 27,622 5,549 5,199 3,693 71.0
5 1,506,257 77,539 15,062 14,128 11,406 80.7
6 757,687 34,196 7,064 6,666 4,846 72.7
7 884,028 40,650 8,130 7,573 4,367 57.7
8 1,880,469 92,831 16,982 15,822 11,038 69.8
9 832,348 39,271 7,563 7,061 4,597 65.1
10 1,019,490 41,404 8,080 7,501 4,741 63.2
11 85,573 4,836 774 724 535 73.9
12 145,978 7,581 1,536 1,493 992 66.4
MR 5,888,642 289,577 54,436 51,458 43,958 85.4
Country 14,623,269 714,489 136,617 128,241 97,937 76.4
Notes:
( 1 ) National Characterization Survey, CASEN 1998
( 2 ) Ministry of Education.
( 3 ) Developed by the author in basis of information  DEMRE.






Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
a. Individual Characteristics
Age 19.04 3.10 19.07 2.94 18.88 3.08
Grades (1) 501 136.3 494 121.5 524 121.6
b. Family Characteristics (2)
Father Primary Education=1 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.43
Father Secondary Education=1 0.43 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.43 0.50
Father Superior Education=1 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.47
Mother Primary Education=1 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44
Mother Secondary Education=1 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50
Mother Superior Education=1 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44
c. School Characteristics
Private=1 0.21 0.40 0.22 0.42 0.19 0.39
Municipal=1 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.45 0.50
Voucher=1 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.36 0.48
Male School=1 0.09 0.29 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00
Female School=1 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.45
Both Sexes=1 0.76 0.43 0.80 0.40 0.72 0.45
Humanistic=1 0.75 0.43 0.73 0.44 0.78 0.41
Daily Schedule=1 0.90 0.30 0.89 0.31 0.92 0.28
Region=1 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16
Region=2 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19
Region=3 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13
Region=4 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19
Region=5 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32
Region=6 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21
Region=7 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22
Region=8 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.33
Region=9 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21
Region=10 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21
Region=11 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07
Region=12 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10
Region=13 0.44 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.43 0.50
N° of Observations
Notes:
           (1) Standardized grades from secondary education
           (2) In each parents educational category incomplete level is included
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, 1998
Total Males Females







        PAA Mathematics
Variables Male Female Male  Female
Father primary Education=1 470 439 465 442
Father sec. Education=1 501 472 500 484
Father sup. Education=1 573 543 570 557
Mother primary Education=1 472 439 467 442
Mother sec. Education=1 507 478 506 490
Mother sup. Education=1 578 549 576 564
Father/Mother Sup. Education 596 565 591 579
Private=1 584 564 579 573
Municipal=1 492 458 490 467
Voucher=1 509 478 508 492
Male school=1 571 480 566 496
Female school=1 544 510 560 521
Both sexes=1 505 476 504 486
Region 1=1 497 469 501 485
Region 2=1 505 475 493 476
Region 3=1 495 469 479 470
Region 4=1 500 468 496 472
Region 5=1 512 479 514 491
Region 6=1 508 476 500 481
Region 7=1 519 489 503 491
Region 8=1 520 487 507 489
Region 9=1 501 465 499 476
Region 10=1 506 475 505 483
Region 11=1 502 471 504 490
Region 12=1 530 497 527 505
Region 13=1 528 495 532 511
TOTAL 518 486 516 496
      PAA Reading




Variables Municipal Private Voucher Municipal Private Voucher
Male 492 584 509 490 579 508
Female 458 564 478 467 573 492
Father primary Education=1 445 492 460 441 503 464
Father sec. Education=1 475 529 486 480 533 493
Father sup. Education=1 516 600 535 526 600 544
Mother primary Education=1 446 483 461 443 493 465
Mother sec. Education=1 478 542 489 484 544 497
Mother sup. Education=1 519 604 539 532 605 549
Father/Mother Sup. Education 534 612 552 547 611 561
Male school=1 560 623 535 558 617 529
Female school=1 497 606 488 509 609 501
Both sexes=1 458 562 487 461 565 495
Region 1=1 456 517 502 466 533 508
Region 2=1 458 543 525 450 539 525
Region 3=1 442 598 525 439 583 513
Region 4=1 451 600 513 451 582 517
Region 5=1 454 560 495 461 566 502
Region 6=1 456 584 490 457 576 488
Region 7=1 481 565 513 473 554 511
Region 8=1 475 582 512 471 568 511
Region 9=1 457 582 492 463 587 496
Region 10=1 465 565 505 470 566 505
Region 11=1 442 509 532 455 518 540
Region 12=1 491 561 521 492 561 527
Region 13=1 494 582 479 505 587 492
TOTAL 474 574 492 478 576 499
PAA Mathematics PAA Reading
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics - Averages Scores by type of Schools (1998)  33
Probability of Attending a Private School
Age 0.0005 0.0004
0.38 0.49
Age square -0.0003 -0.0004
-0.17 -0.42
Father secondary education=1 0.0068 0.0051
5.29 5.85
Father superior education=1 0.0288 0.0239
5.41 5.13
Mother secondary education=1 0.0099 0.0071
5.63 5.80
Mother superior education=1 0.0361 0.0287
5.32 5.46
Dummy Private School available 0.2508 0.2062
12.69 10.38
Dummy Voucher School available -0.0111 -0.0141
-0.76 -0.95
Probability of Attending a Voucher School
Age -0.3285 -0.0283
-3.78 -4.55
Age square 0.0404 0.0329
3.46 3.40
Father secondary education=1 0.0019 0.0153
0.15 1.49
Father superior education=1 0.0200 0.0366
0.88 1.43
Mother secondary education=1 0.0259 0.0415
2.63 3.90
Mother superior education=1 0.0411 0.0676
1.77 2.72
Dummy Private School available -0.0648 -0.0142
-1.79 -1.18
Dummy Voucher School available 0.4651 0.4782
19.38 16.13
Observations 56,395 63,055
Robust z-statistics below marginal effects
Public schools is the comparison group
Females Males
Marginal Effects
Table 6: First Stage, Multinomial Logit  35
 
 
Table 7: Availability of schools type by community. Marginal effects.
Individual characteristics
Age 0.216 1.322 1.316 2.46 2.167 2.171 0.887 1.123 1.108 0.036 0.043 0.042
[1.1] [1.7] [1.7] [2.2] [1.9] [2.0] [2.1] [2.1] [2.2] [1.6] [1.6] [1.7]
Age square -0.628 -2.911 -2.902 -5.738 -5.136 -5.097 -1.929 -2.285 -2.255 -0.075 -0.091 -0.09
Paretal education
[1.6] [1.8] [1.8] [2.4] [2.1] [2.2] [2.2] [2.1] [2.2] [1.7] [1.7] [1.8]
Father sec. Education=1 0.41 -0.031 -0.016 -1.433 -1.158 -1.161 0.501 0.874 0.902 0.028 0.034 0.032
[2.2] [0.0] [0.0] [1.6] [1.2] [1.2] [1.2] [1.9] [1.8] [1.2] [1.2] [1.2]
Father sup. Education=1 -0.038 -0.5 -0.448 -0.812 -0.72 -0.998 -0.245 -0.422 -0.414 -0.012 -0.015 -0.015
[0.1] [0.4] [0.4] [0.7] [0.6] [0.9] [0.5] [0.6] [0.6] [0.5] [0.5] [0.5]
Mother sec. Education=1 0.482 1.452 1.381 1.521 1.456 1.729 1.354 0.571 0.561 0.024 0.03 0.029
[2.2] [1.6] [1.7] [1.7] [1.6] [1.7] [3.2] [1.1] [1.1] [1.0] [1.0] [1.1]
Mother sup. Education=1 1.013 4.363 4.322 5.107 4.717 4.969 1.271 1.201 1.109 -0.003 -0.004 0.001
[3.2] [3.0] [3.2] [3.8] [3.3] [3.7] [2.3] [1.6] [1.5] [0.1] [0.1] [0.0]
Average Community characteristics
Community total population 0.718 0.845 0.789 0.061 0.075 0.073
[3.2] [3.0] [3.0] [3.4] [3.3] [3.2]
Density  -2.696 -2.295 -0.103 -0.074
[1.1] [1.0] [0.5] [0.3]
Community average per capita income 0.034 0.077 0.124 0.016 0.001 0.001
[0.2] [0.4] [0.6] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2]
Observations 297 181 181 181 181 181 297 181 181 181 181 181
Robust z-statistics in brackets
Dependent variable: availabilty of private school at community Dependent variable: availabilty of voucher school at community  36
 
Table 8: Second Stage, OLS and TSLS estimates
Male Female Male Female Male Male Female Female Male Female Male Female Male Male Female Female
A B A B A B A B
Individual characteristics
Age -0.80 -1.64 -0.94 -1.81 0.06 -0.44 -1.10 -1.56 6.81 4.85 6.74 4.88 8.40 7.57 6.24 5.33
[0.5] [1.7] [0.4] [1.4] [0.0] [0.2] [1.1] [1.5] [4.9] [5.2] [4.1] [4.2] [5.8] [4.7] [6.4] [5.2]
Age square 1.52 0.86 1.64 1.09 0.30 0.93 0.29 0.68 -6.50 -6.65 -6.46 -6.65 -8.61 -7.64 -8.20 -7.37
[0.7] [0.5] [0.6] [0.6] [0.1] [0.4] [0.2] [0.4] [2.8] [4.1] [2.7] [3.8] [3.7] [3.1] [5.2] [4.4]
Parental education
Father sec. Education=1 18.17 18.64 15.84 16.05 11.17 10.52 12.44 12.18 21.98 25.32 19.84 22.77 14.62 12.86 17.49 16.27
[11.5] [12.6] [8.3] [8.4] [7.3] [7.1] [9.5] [9.6] [13.1] [14.8] [11.5] [11.2] [8.3] [7.0] [11.4] [11.7]
Father sup. Education=1 67.44 64.80 54.83 49.36 34.05 38.55 35.50 39.04 67.66 72.20 56.31 58.53 34.93 38.91 40.73 44.14
[18.3] [16.3] [14.8] [13.6] [7.0] [8.6] [10.3] [12.0] [17.3] [18.5] [17.9] [15.5] [6.5] [8.4] [11.1] [13.5]
Mother sec. Education=1 16.62 20.69 13.06 16.86 5.57 6.81 11.60 13.03 23.0 27.1 19.7 23.4 11.2 11.6 15.7 17.2
[11.9] [13.2] [7.8] [10.7] [3.0] [3.9] [7.1] [8.5] [15.4] [14.4] [10.2] [12.5] [6.2] [7.1] [7.5] [8.8]
Mother sup. Education=1 63.38 67.02 49.87 50.68 27.03 33.48 35.40 41.04 70.80 76.47 58.61 61.88 34.83 41.24 41.93 48.90
[17.1] [17.3] [18.0] [18.4] [4.7] [7.1] [8.8] [10.9] [20.9] [19.8] [21.8] [20.2] [6.1] [9.4] [9.6] [13.2]
School choice
Attending a Private School=1 54.10 65.64 49.28 59.58
[3.2] [5.7] [3.2] [5.2]
Attending a Voucher School=1 11.46 12.93 12.41 18.39
[1.2] [1.9] [1.3] [2.6]
Predicted probabilities from first stage
Probability of attending a private school 155.62 91.18 131.75 66.65 159.85 88.80 148.20 76.19
[9.6] [5.6] [8.0] [4.7] [9.3] [5.6] [9.2] [5.3]
Probability of attending a voucher school 75.09 48.59 58.53 32.10 100.16 63.22 94.37 55.22
[6.7] [3.3] [6.8] [2.9] [7.3] [3.6] [7.9] [3.5]
Community characteristics
Density (total population /kms square) -40.57 -126.68 71.89 -23.76
[0.6] [4.2] [1.0] [0.8]
Community total population 4.51 2.79 5.51 5.05
[1.8] [2.0] [2.4] [4.6]
Community average per capita income 12.16 14.35 12.07 13.19
[14.6] [18.0] [14.7] [18.2]
Constant 472.12 458.67 469.33 455.85 429.94 429.97 428.66 429.50 347.85 363.27 343.71 355.74 285.84 291.84 308.17 317.19
[18.5] [32.5] [13.1] [21.6] [18.1] [15.4] [30.4] [27.9] [16.5] [27.6] [12.0] [18.3] [13.6] [11.5] [21.6] [19.0]
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
F (2,180) 6.27 2.88 7.23 4.61
Prob > F 0.0023 0.0585 0.001 0.0103
Observations 56,395 63,055 56,395 63,055 56,395 54,267 63,055 60,328 56,395 63,055 56,395 63,055 56,395 54,267 63,055 60,328
R-squared 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.23 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.20
Robust t-statistics in brackets
Public schools is the comparison group
Mathematics Reading
OLS TSLS OLS TSLS  37
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